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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56175
  

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dc.contributor.authorEllingsen, Toreen_US
dc.contributor.authorÖstling, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:05:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:05:23Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56175-
dc.description.abstractWe model organizational decision making as costless pre-play communication. Decision making is called authoritarian if only one player is allowed to speak and consensual if all players are allowed to speak. Players are assumed to have limited cognitive capacity and we characterize their behavior under each decision making regime for two different cognitive hierarchy models. Our results suggest that authoritarian decision making is optimal when players have conflicting preferences over the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, whereas consensual decision making is optimal when players have congruent preferences over this set. The intuition is that authoritarian decision making avoids conflict, but sometimes creates insufficient mutual trust to implement socially optimal outcomes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherEkonomiska Forskningsinst. Stockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 634en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelL20en_US
dc.subject.jelM21en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordOrganizational decision makingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordination gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommunicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcognitive hierarchy modelsen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwOrganisationen_US
dc.subject.stwKonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleOrganizational structure as the channeling of boundedly rational pre-play communicationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn518069885en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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