|
EconStor >
Stockholm School of Economics >
EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56175
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Ellingsen, Tore | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Östling, Robert | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-03-28T13:05:23Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-03-28T13:05:23Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2006 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56175 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We model organizational decision making as costless pre-play communication. Decision making is called authoritarian if only one player is allowed to speak and consensual if all players are allowed to speak. Players are assumed to have limited cognitive capacity and we characterize their behavior under each decision making regime for two different cognitive hierarchy models. Our results suggest that authoritarian decision making is optimal when players have conflicting preferences over the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, whereas consensual decision making is optimal when players have congruent preferences over this set. The intuition is that authoritarian decision making avoids conflict, but sometimes creates insufficient mutual trust to implement socially optimal outcomes. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Ekonomiska Forskningsinst. Stockholm | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 634 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L20 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M54 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Organizational decision making | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | coordination games | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | communication | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | cognitive hierarchy models | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kommunikation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entscheidungstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Organisation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Konflikt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Organizational structure as the channeling of boundedly rational pre-play communication | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 518069885 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|