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dc.contributor.authorBlonski, Matthiasen
dc.contributor.authorSpagnolo, Giancarloen
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:04:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:04:58Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56161-
dc.description.abstractWe find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner's dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible, or at least questionable: for a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated by non-cooperation (according to the Harsanyi-Selten 1988 criterion). Examples include collusion equilibria in the repeated Cournot duopoly.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x437en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPrisoner's Dilemmaen
dc.subject.keywordRisk dominanceen
dc.subject.keywordRepeated gamesen
dc.subject.keywordEquilibrium selectionen
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen
dc.subject.keywordCollusionen
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePrisoners' other dilemma-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn333195701en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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