Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56161
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dc.contributor.authorBlonski, Matthiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorSpagnolo, Giancarloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:04:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:04:58Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56161-
dc.description.abstractWe find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner's dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible, or at least questionable: for a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated by non-cooperation (according to the Harsanyi-Selten 1988 criterion). Examples include collusion equilibria in the repeated Cournot duopoly.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x437en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPrisoner's Dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.keywordRisk dominanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordRepeated gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordEquilibrium selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordCollusionen_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePrisoners' other dilemmaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn333195701en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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