Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56149 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 458
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization's performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.
Schlagwörter: 
Leader
Credit claiming
asymmetric information
Equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
J33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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