EconStor >
Stockholm School of Economics >
EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56134
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLaun, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:04:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:04:14Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56134-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes optimal insurance against unemployment and disability in a private information economy with endogenous health and search effort. Individuals can reduce the probability of becoming disabled by exerting, so-called, prevention effort, which is costly in terms of utility. A healthy, i.e., not disabled, individual either works or is unemployed. An unemployed individual can exert search effort in order to increase the probability of finding a new job. I show that the optimal sequence of consumption is increasing for a working individual and constant for a disabled individual. During unemployment, decreasing benefits are not necessarily optimal in this setting. The prevention constraint implies increasing benefits over time while the search constraint demands decreasing benefits while being unemployed. However, if individuals respond sufficiently much to search incentives, the latter effect dominates the former and the optimal consumption sequence is decreasing during unemployment.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherEkonomiska Forskningsinst. Stockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 742en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelE24en_US
dc.subject.jelH53en_US
dc.subject.jelJ65en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordUnemployment insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordDisability insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordOptimal contractsen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwErwerbsunfähigkeitsrenteen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal social insurance with endogenous healthen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn688947050en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
688947050.pdf206.16 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.