Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56134
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dc.contributor.authorLaun, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:04:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:04:14Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56134-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes optimal insurance against unemployment and disability in a private information economy with endogenous health and search effort. Individuals can reduce the probability of becoming disabled by exerting, so-called, prevention effort, which is costly in terms of utility. A healthy, i.e., not disabled, individual either works or is unemployed. An unemployed individual can exert search effort in order to increase the probability of finding a new job. I show that the optimal sequence of consumption is increasing for a working individual and constant for a disabled individual. During unemployment, decreasing benefits are not necessarily optimal in this setting. The prevention constraint implies increasing benefits over time while the search constraint demands decreasing benefits while being unemployed. However, if individuals respond sufficiently much to search incentives, the latter effect dominates the former and the optimal consumption sequence is decreasing during unemployment.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x742en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelE24en_US
dc.subject.jelH53en_US
dc.subject.jelJ65en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordUnemployment insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordDisability insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordOptimal contractsen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwErwerbsunfähigkeitsrenteen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal social insurance with endogenous healthen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn688947050en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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