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dc.contributor.authorVoorneveld, Marken
dc.contributor.authorLundström, Helena Fagraeusen
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:04:02Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:04:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56126-
dc.description.abstractIn a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's inessential transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x605en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExtensive form gamesen
dc.subject.keywordQuantal response equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordLogit modelen
dc.subject.keywordStrategic equivalenceen
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwLogit-Modellen
dc.titleStrategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn501540938en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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