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EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56126
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Voorneveld, Mark | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Lundström, Helena Fagraeus | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-03-28T13:04:02Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-03-28T13:04:02Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56126 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's inessential transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Ekonomiska Forskningsinst. Stockholm | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 605 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Extensive form games | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Quantal response equilibrium | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Logit model | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Strategic equivalence | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Beschränkte Rationalität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Logit-Modell | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 501540938 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics
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