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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56126
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| Title: | | Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games  |
| Authors: | | Voorneveld, Mark Lundström, Helena Fagraeus |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 605 |
| Abstract: | | In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's inessential transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs. |
| Subjects: | | Extensive form games Quantal response equilibrium Logit model Strategic equivalence |
| JEL: | | C72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics
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