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Title:Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games PDF Logo
Authors:Voorneveld, Mark
Lundström, Helena Fagraeus
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 605
Abstract:In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's inessential transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs.
Subjects:Extensive form games
Quantal response equilibrium
Logit model
Strategic equivalence
JEL:C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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