Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56126
Authors: 
Voorneveld, Mark
Lundström, Helena Fagraeus
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 605
Abstract: 
In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's inessential transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs.
Subjects: 
Extensive form games
Quantal response equilibrium
Logit model
Strategic equivalence
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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