Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56111
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dc.contributor.authorSegendorff, Björnen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:03:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:03:39Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56111-
dc.description.abstractThis study investigates under what circumstances there exist a separating equilibrium in which competent leaders choose incompetent co-workers and incompetent leaders choose competent co-workers. The driving force for the competent leader is the insurance motive; if things go wrong he can blame the incompetent co-worker and remain his reputation of being competent. For the incompetent leader the expected gain from such an insurance is outweighed by its costs in terms of lower expected policy outcome. Co-workers are motivated by career opportunities allowing for conflicting interests between the leader and the co-worker.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x406en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSeparating equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordco-workeren_US
dc.subject.keywordblameen_US
dc.subject.keywordscapegoaten_US
dc.titleA signalling theory of scapegoatsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn687679699en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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