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Title:A generalization of the Shapley-Ichiishi result PDF Logo
Authors:Kuipers, Jeroen
Vermeulen, Dries
Voorneveld, Mark
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 711
Abstract:The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear inequalities with each equivalence class, and we show that the system defines the class. Application of this general theorem to the class of convex games yields an alternative proof of the Shapley-Ichiishi result. Other applications range from computation of stable sets in non-cooperative game theory to determination of classes of TU games on which the core correspondence is additive (even linear). For the case of convex games we prove that the theorem provides the minimal defining system of linear inequalities. An example shows that this is not necessarily true for other equivalence classes of balanced games.
Subjects:cooperative games
Shapley-Ichiishi
balanced games
core
JEL:C71
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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