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SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56100
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Ternström, Ingela | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-02-29 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-03-28T13:03:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-03-28T13:03:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2001 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56100 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Many of the world's common pool resources are located in poor countries, where consumption levels may be low enough to adversely affect the users' health. Under these circumstances, an agent's utility function may be described as an S-shaped function of consumption. Using non-cooperative game theory, very poor groups of users are shown to have lower probability of cooperative management of common pool resources than groups with adequate consumption levels. However, users that are only moderately poor have the greatest chance for cooperation. For this group, if resource productivity varies, cooperation may break down in periods of low productivity. The theoretical results concur with empirical evidence of cooperation in common pool resources. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Ekonomiska Forskningsinst. Stockholm | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 428 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q15 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q25 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Common pool resource | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | developing countries | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | dynamic game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | irrigation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | natural resource | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | non-linear utility | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Cooperation or conflict in common pools | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 687672376 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics
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