EconStor >
Stockholm School of Economics >
EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56100
  
Title:Cooperation or conflict in common pools PDF Logo
Authors:Ternström, Ingela
Issue Date:2001
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 428
Abstract:Many of the world's common pool resources are located in poor countries, where consumption levels may be low enough to adversely affect the users' health. Under these circumstances, an agent's utility function may be described as an S-shaped function of consumption. Using non-cooperative game theory, very poor groups of users are shown to have lower probability of cooperative management of common pool resources than groups with adequate consumption levels. However, users that are only moderately poor have the greatest chance for cooperation. For this group, if resource productivity varies, cooperation may break down in periods of low productivity. The theoretical results concur with empirical evidence of cooperation in common pool resources.
Subjects:Common pool resource
developing countries
dynamic game
irrigation
natural resource
non-linear utility
JEL:C72
O13
Q15
Q25
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
687672376.pdf336.81 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56100

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.