Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56095
Authors: 
Matros, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 403
Abstract: 
Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce cleverness of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's [9] prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategies distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents.
Subjects: 
Evolution
game theory
bounded rationality
Markov chain
stochastic stability
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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