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Title:Clever agents in adaptive learning PDF Logo
Authors:Matros, Alexander
Issue Date:2000
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 403
Abstract:Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce cleverness of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's [9] prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategies distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents.
Subjects:Evolution
game theory
bounded rationality
Markov chain
stochastic stability
JEL:C72
C73
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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