|
EconStor >
Stockholm School of Economics >
EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56088
|
| | |
| Title: | | The market for melons: Cournot competition with unobserval qualities  |
| Authors: | | Argenton, Cédric |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 617 |
| Abstract: | | Two firms produce different qualities at possibly different, constant marginal costs. They compete in quantities on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. The model is a generalization of the standard Cournot duopoly, which corresponds to the special case where the two qualities are equal. When the quality differential is large, the firms' output levels are not always strategic substitutes. There can be no, or up to three pure-strategy equilibria. Yet, as long as the cost differential is not extreme, there always exists a stable duopolistic equilibrium. In that sense, strategic quantity-setting helps prevent market unraveling. |
| Subjects: | | Cournot competition quality duopoly asymmetric information Nash equilibrium |
| JEL: | | D43 D82 L13 L15 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56088
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|