Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56077
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Le Coq, Chloé | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-28T13:02:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-28T13:02:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56077 | - |
dc.description.abstract | It has been argued that having a contract market before the spot market enhances competition (Allaz and Vila, 1993). Taking into account the repeated nature of electricity markets, we check the robustness of the argument that the access to contract markets reduces the market power of generators. In particular, we investigate the sensitivity of this result with respect to the finite horizon assumption. This paper proposes a model of the electricity market where firms sign long-term supply contracts with their retailers. Subsequently, the firms repeatedly interact on the spot market. It is shown that contract markets help sustain collusion on the spot market. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholm | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x552 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D43 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L94 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Contract market | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Electricity | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Spot Market | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Forward | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Tacit collusion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Elektrizitätswirtschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Markt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Termingeschäft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kartell | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vertragsrecht | en |
dc.title | Long-term supply contracts and collusion in the electricity market | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 379433389 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.