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dc.contributor.authorHunold, Matthiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorRöller, Lars-Hendriken_US
dc.contributor.authorStahl, Konraden_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-27T09:33:46Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-27T09:33:46Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-322041-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56060-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the effects of downstream firms' acquisition of pure cash flow rights in an efficient upstream supplier when all firms compete in prices. With an acquisition, downstream firms internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales. Double marginalization is enhanced. Whereas full vertical integration would lead to decreasing, passive backwards ownership leads to increasing downstream prices and is more profitable, as long as competition is sufficiently intensive. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, inducing the efficient supplier to commit to high prices. All results are sustained when upstream suppliers are allowed to charge two part tariffs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 12-022en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelL40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddouble marginalizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic delegationen_US
dc.subject.keywordvertical integrationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpartial ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon agencyen_US
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen_US
dc.subject.stwVertikale Konzentrationen_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalbeteiligungen_US
dc.subject.stwÜbernahmeen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Preispolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwPreiswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBackwards integration and strategic delegationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn689156774en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:12022-
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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