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dc.contributor.authorGeys, Bennyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-26T15:04:10Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-26T15:04:10Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56052-
dc.description.abstractPolitical parties are often argued to compete for voters by stressing issues they feel they own - a strategy known as 'selective emphasis'. While usually seen as an electorally rewarding strategy, this article argues that cultivating your themes in the public debate is not guaranteed to be electorally beneficial and may even become counter-productive. It describes the conditions under which 'selective emphasis' becomes counter-productive, and applies the argument to recent discussions regarding the strategies of mainstream parties confronting the extreme right.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWZB Discussion Paper SP II 2012-102en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordissue salienceen_US
dc.subject.keywordissue ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordparty competitionen_US
dc.subject.stwParteipolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwParteiprogrammen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.titleSuccess and failure in electoral competition: Selective issue emphasis under incomplete issue ownershipen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn688718728en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012102-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB

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