EconStor >
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) >
Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56051
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLohse, Timen_US
dc.contributor.authorRobledo, Julio R.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-26T15:04:07Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-26T15:04:07Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56051-
dc.description.abstractMotivated by recent disasters, this paper analyzes the risk sharing aspect in a federation. The regions can be hit by a shock leading to losses that occur with an exogenous probability and in a stochastically independent way. The regions can spend effort on selfinsurance to reduce the size of the loss. Being part of a federation has two countervailing -elfare effects. On the one hand, there is the well known welfare increase due to risk pooling. On the other hand, the self-insurance effort is a public good, because all regions benefit from the reduction of the loss. There exists a Samaritan's dilemma kind of effect whereby regions reduce their self-insurance effort potentially leading to an overall welfare decrease. The central government can solve this dilemma by committing to fixed rather than variable transfers. This induces regions that behave non-cooperatively to still choose the efficient level of self-insurance effort.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWZB Discussion Paper SP II 2012-103en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelH72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordintergovernmental transfersen_US
dc.subject.keywordself-insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keyworddisaster policyen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwKatastrophenhilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwSchocken_US
dc.subject.stwSelbstversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePublic self-insurance and the Samaritan's dilemma in a federationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn688719341en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012103-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
688719341.pdf248.97 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.