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Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56051
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Lohse, Tim | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Robledo, Julio R. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-03-16 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-03-26T15:04:07Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-03-26T15:04:07Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56051 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Motivated by recent disasters, this paper analyzes the risk sharing aspect in a federation. The regions can be hit by a shock leading to losses that occur with an exogenous probability and in a stochastically independent way. The regions can spend effort on selfinsurance to reduce the size of the loss. Being part of a federation has two countervailing -elfare effects. On the one hand, there is the well known welfare increase due to risk pooling. On the other hand, the self-insurance effort is a public good, because all regions benefit from the reduction of the loss. There exists a Samaritan's dilemma kind of effect whereby regions reduce their self-insurance effort potentially leading to an overall welfare decrease. The central government can solve this dilemma by committing to fixed rather than variable transfers. This induces regions that behave non-cooperatively to still choose the efficient level of self-insurance effort. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | WZB Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik: Forschungsprofessur & Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism SP II 2012-103 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H77 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | intergovernmental transfers | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | self-insurance | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | disaster policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Finanzausgleich | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gefangenendilemma | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Katastrophenhilfe | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Schock | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Selbstversicherung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Public self-insurance and the Samaritan's dilemma in a federation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 688719341 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
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