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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56037
  

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dc.contributor.authorGraf, Juliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-20T16:57:04Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-20T16:57:04Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-044-4en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56037-
dc.description.abstractGroup Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) increasingly gain in importance with respect to the supply of pharmaceutical products and frequently use multiple or exclusive rebate contracts to exercise market power. Based on a Hotelling model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine the controversy whether there exists a superior rebate scheme as far as consumer surplus, firms profits and total welfare are concerned. Accounting for horizontal and vertical differentiation, we find that firms clearly prefer multiple over exclusive rebate contracts. Contrary, there exists no rebate form that per se lowers total costs for the members of the GPOs or maximizes total welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE discussion paper 45en_US
dc.subject.jelI11en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordGPOsen_US
dc.subject.keywordRebate Contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordVertical Differentiationen_US
dc.titleThe effects of rebate contracts on the health care systemen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn688727263en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:45-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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