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Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf >
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf >
DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56037
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Graf, Julia | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-03-16 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-03-20T16:57:04Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-03-20T16:57:04Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn | | 978-3-86304-044-4 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56037 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) increasingly gain in importance with respect to the supply of pharmaceutical products and frequently use multiple or exclusive rebate contracts to exercise market power. Based on a Hotelling model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine the controversy whether there exists a superior rebate scheme as far as consumer surplus, firms profits and total welfare are concerned. Accounting for horizontal and vertical differentiation, we find that firms clearly prefer multiple over exclusive rebate contracts. Contrary, there exists no rebate form that per se lowers total costs for the members of the GPOs or maximizes total welfare. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | DICE Düsseldorf | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | DICE discussion paper 45 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | I11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L42 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | GPOs | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Rebate Contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Vertical Differentiation | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The effects of rebate contracts on the health care system | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 688727263 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:dicedp:45 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
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