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Discussion Papers, Deutsche Bundesbank >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56024
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| Title: | | Executive board composition and bank risk taking  |
| Authors: | | Berger, Allen N. Kick, Thomas Schaeck, Klaus |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Papers, Deutsche Bundesbank 03/2012 |
| Abstract: | | Little is known about how socioeconomic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we show how age, gender, and education composition of executive teams affect risk taking of financial institutions. First, we establish that age, gender, and education jointly affect the variability of bank performance. Second, we use difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements and find that younger executive teams increase risk taking, as do board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives. In contrast, if board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, risk taking declines. |
| Subjects: | | Banks executives risk taking age gender education |
| JEL: | | G21 G34 I21 J16 |
| ISBN: | | 978-3-86558-795-4 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Deutsche Bundesbank
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