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dc.contributor.authorNeckermann, Susanneen_US
dc.contributor.authorCueni, Retoen_US
dc.contributor.authorFrey, Bruno S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-15T17:04:54Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-15T17:04:54Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56017-
dc.description.abstractSocial incentives like employee awards are widespread in the corporate sector and may be important instruments for solving agency problems. To date, we have little understanding of their effect on behavior. Unique panel data from the call center of a Fortune 500 financial services provider allow us to estimate the impact of awards on performance. Winning an award for voluntary work behaviors significantly increases subsequent core call center performance. The effect is short-lived, mainly driven by underperforming agents, and is reflected mostly in dimensions of the job that are hard to observe.We discuss various theories that could explain the effect.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 12-004en_US
dc.subject.jelC23en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAwardsen_US
dc.subject.keywordMotivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordNon-monetary Compensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordInsider Econometricsen_US
dc.titleAwards at worken_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn687839459en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:12004-
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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