Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim >
ZEW Discussion Papers >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
| || |
|Title:||Awards at work |
Frey, Bruno S.
|Issue Date:||2012 |
|Series/Report no.:||ZEW Discussion Papers 12-004|
|Abstract:||Social incentives like employee awards are widespread in the corporate sector and may be important instruments for solving agency problems. To date, we have little understanding of their effect on behavior. Unique panel data from the call center of a Fortune 500 financial services provider allow us to estimate the impact of awards on performance. Winning an award for voluntary work behaviors significantly increases subsequent core call center performance. The effect is short-lived, mainly driven by underperforming agents, and is reflected mostly in dimensions of the job that are hard to observe.We discuss various theories that could explain the effect.|
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW|
ZEW Discussion Papers
Download bibliographical data as:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.