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dc.contributor.authorKraizberg, Ellien_US
dc.contributor.authorGargalas, Vassilios N.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-15T14:12:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-15T14:12:23Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Entrepreneurial Finance, JEF 1551-9570 7 2002 2 83-103en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55990-
dc.description.abstractAs of 1998, nine percent of the shares of all firms in the US, primarily young and small ones, have been owned, essentially by about 17 million employees. The recent trend of new ventures to grant company-wide stock options plans is an alignment of the interests of management, shareholders, and non-managerial employees. This paper empirically explores the hypothesis that company-wide stock options plans primarily serve the interests of the firm.s management. This is true, whether or not, management owns a stake in the firm.s equity, though the degree of his or her motivation varies depending on the size of his/her stake in the firm.s equity. The paper unambiguously disproves the view that grants of employee stock options are meant to ease cash flow strains for small young firms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMontrose, California Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance - AEFen_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleWhy new ventures grant employee-stock-optionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ppn662362675en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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