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dc.contributor.authorFabbri, Francescaen_US
dc.contributor.authorMarin, Daliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-13T16:25:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-13T16:25:17Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55872-
dc.description.abstractThe compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone's hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest firms in Germany in the period 1977-2009 we test two prominent hypothesis in the literature on executive pay: the manager power hypothesis and the efficient pay hypothesis. We find support for the manager power hypothesis for Germany as executives tend to be rewarded when the sector is doing well rather than the firm they work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has contributed to the rise in executive pay in Germany. Lastly, we show that CEOs in the banking sector are provided with incentives for performance and that the great recession of 2009 acted as a disciplining devise on CEO pay in Germany.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Labour Markets 3757en_US
dc.subject.jelF23en_US
dc.subject.jelJ30en_US
dc.subject.jelM12en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexecutive compensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwManagervergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwMachten_US
dc.subject.stwEffizienzlohnen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleWhat explains the rise in CEO pay in Germany? A panel data analysis for 1977-2009en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn68833539Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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