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dc.contributor.authorMayer, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorMujumdar, Sudeshen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-08T16:47:45Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-08T16:47:45Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55854-
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers 2012-15en_US
dc.subject.jelF16en_US
dc.subject.jelH0en_US
dc.subject.jelL1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordlobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordfree-rider problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordsize-distribution-of-firmsen_US
dc.subject.keywordworld-priceen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor-market-flexibilityen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenvertretungen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebsgrößenstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwAußenhandelspreisen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktflexibilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleLobbying: Buying and utilizing accessen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn687954290en_US
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201215-
Appears in Collections:Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Discussion Papers

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