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Title:Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access PDF Logo
Authors:Mayer, Wolfgang
Mujumdar, Sudesh
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:Economics Discussion Papers 2012-15
Abstract:This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment.
Subjects:lobbying
free-rider problem
size-distribution-of-firms
world-price
labor-market-flexibility
JEL:F16
H0
L1
Creative Commons License:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Discussion Papers

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