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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55854
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| Title: | | Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access  |
| Authors: | | Mayer, Wolfgang Mujumdar, Sudesh |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Economics Discussion Papers 2012-15 |
| Abstract: | | This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment. |
| Subjects: | | lobbying free-rider problem size-distribution-of-firms world-price labor-market-flexibility |
| JEL: | | F16 H0 L1 |
| Creative Commons License: | |  |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Discussion Papers
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