Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55626
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dc.contributor.authorGoette, Lorenzen_US
dc.contributor.authorHuffman, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Stephanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-23T08:24:26Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-23T08:24:26Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55626-
dc.description.abstractDue to incomplete contracts, efficiency of an organization depends on willingness of individuals to take non-selfish actions, such as cooperating when there is no incentive to do so or punishing inefficient actions by others. Organizations also constitute a social boundary, or group. We investigate whether this social aspect of organizations has an important benefit- fostering unselfish cooperation and norm enforcement within the group-but also whether there is a dark side, in the form of hostility between groups. Our experiment provides the first evidence free from the confounding effect of self-selection into groups. Individuals are randomly assigned to different platoons during a four-week period of officer training in the Swiss Army. We conduct choice experiments-simultaneous prisoner's dilemma games, with and without third-party punishment-in week three. Random assignment significantly increases willingness to cooperate with fellow platoon members. Assignment does not lead to hostility, in the sense of vindictive punishment of outsiders, but does affect norm enforcement, enhancing willingness to enforce a norm of cooperation towards fellow platoon members. This suggests that the social aspect of organizations motivates efficient behavior even when ordinary incentives fail and helps to explain practices designed to foster social ties or group identification within an organization.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MAen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston |x06-7en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelJ00en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwInteressengruppentheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Kontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen_US
dc.titleThe impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: Evidence using random assignment to real social groupsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn514905298en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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