Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55626 
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dc.contributor.authorGoette, Lorenzen
dc.contributor.authorHuffman, Daviden
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Stephanen
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-25-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-23T08:24:26Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-23T08:24:26Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55626-
dc.description.abstractDue to incomplete contracts, efficiency of an organization depends on willingness of individuals to take non-selfish actions, such as cooperating when there is no incentive to do so or punishing inefficient actions by others. Organizations also constitute a social boundary, or group. We investigate whether this social aspect of organizations has an important benefit- fostering unselfish cooperation and norm enforcement within the group-but also whether there is a dark side, in the form of hostility between groups. Our experiment provides the first evidence free from the confounding effect of self-selection into groups. Individuals are randomly assigned to different platoons during a four-week period of officer training in the Swiss Army. We conduct choice experiments-simultaneous prisoner's dilemma games, with and without third-party punishment-in week three. Random assignment significantly increases willingness to cooperate with fellow platoon members. Assignment does not lead to hostility, in the sense of vindictive punishment of outsiders, but does affect norm enforcement, enhancing willingness to enforce a norm of cooperation towards fellow platoon members. This suggests that the social aspect of organizations motivates efficient behavior even when ordinary incentives fail and helps to explain practices designed to foster social ties or group identification within an organization.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x06-7en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelJ00en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwInteressengruppentheorieen
dc.subject.stwKooperationen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Kontrolleen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen
dc.titleThe impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: Evidence using random assignment to real social groups-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn514905298en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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