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dc.contributor.authorRotemberg, Julio J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-23T08:23:41Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-23T08:23:41Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55606-
dc.description.abstractI suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFederal Reserve Bank of Boston Boston, Mass.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 06-12en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleMinimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn514906103en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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