|
EconStor >
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston >
Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55606
|
| | |
| Title: | | Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game  |
| Authors: | | Rotemberg, Julio J. |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 06-12 |
| Abstract: | | I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). |
| JEL: | | D64 D63 C72 A13 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55606
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|