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Title:Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game PDF Logo
Authors:Rotemberg, Julio J.
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Working paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 06-12
Abstract:I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
JEL:D64
D63
C72
A13
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

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