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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55577
  
Title:Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially PDF Logo
Authors:Ariely, Dan
Bracha, Anat
Meier, Stephan
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Working paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 07-9
Abstract:This paper examines image motivationthe desire to be liked and well-regarded by others as a driver in prosocial behavior (doing good), and asks whether extrinsic monetary incentives (doing well) have a detrimental effect on prosocial behavior due to crowding out of image motivation. By definition, image depends on one's behavior being visible to other people. Using this unique property we show that image is indeed an important part of the motivation to behave prosocially. Moreover, we show that extrinsic incentives interact with image motivation and are therefore less effective in public than in private. Together, these results imply that image motivation is crowded out by monetary incentives; this means that monetary incentives are more likely to be counterproductive for public prosocial activities than for private ones.
JEL:D64
C90
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

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