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dc.contributor.authorWolpert, David H.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJamison, Julianen_US
dc.contributor.authorNewth, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorHarre, Michaelen_US
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a modification to the two-timescale games studied in the evolution of preferences (EOP) literature. In this modification, the strategic process occurring on the long timescale is learning by an individual across his or her lifetime, not natural selection operating on genomes over multiple generations. This change to the longer timescale removes many of the formal difficulties of EOP models and allows us to show how two-timescale games can provide endogenous explanations for why humans sometimes adopt interdependent preferences and sometimes exhibit logit quantal response functions. In particular, we show that our modification to EOP explains experimental data in the Traveler´s Dilemma. We also use our modification to show how cooperation can arise in nonrepeated versions of the Prisoner´s Dilemma (PD). We then show that our modification to EOP predicts a crowding out phenomenon in the PD, in which introducing incentives to cooperate causes players to stop cooperating instead. We also use our modification to predict a tradeoff between the robustness and the benefit of cooperation in the PD.en_US
dc.publisherFederal Reserve Bank of Boston Boston, MAen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 10-10en_US
dc.subject.keywordsingle-shot gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordPrisoner´s Dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.keywordTraveler´s Dilemmaen_US
dc.titleStrategic choice of preferences: The persona modelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
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