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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55552
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| Title: | | Games with synergistic preferences  |
| Authors: | | Jamison, Julian C. |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 11-15 |
| Abstract: | | In economic situations a player often has preferences regarding not only his or her own outcome but also regarding what happens to fellow players, concerns that are entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down a player's final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper, building on a model due to Bergstrom (1989, 1999), presents a simple structure in the context of game theory that incorporates the synergies between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet it is straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied. |
| Subjects: | | altruism interdependent preferences fairness cooperation |
| JEL: | | C72 D03 D64 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
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