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dc.contributor.authorFujiwara, Kenjien_US
dc.contributor.authorLong, Ngo Vanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-15T17:38:12Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-15T17:38:12Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55350-
dc.description.abstractWe formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting cartel. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both players are better off if the importing country is the leader. The follower is worse off if the exporting cartel is the leader. Among the three game-theoretic outcomes, the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country's leadership.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Resources and Environment Economics 3721en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelL72en_US
dc.subject.jelQ34en_US
dc.subject.jelF18en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordexhaustible resourceen_US
dc.subject.keywordStackelberg leadershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal tariffen_US
dc.subject.stwErschöpfbare Ressourcenen_US
dc.subject.stwAußenhandelen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwZolltarifen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal tariffs on exhaustible resources: The case of a quantity setting cartelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn685268225en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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