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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55347
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Blouin, Arthur | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Ghosal, Sayantan | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Mukand, Sharun | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-02-14 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-02-15T17:38:05Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-02-15T17:38:05Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55347 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We analyze whether or not the globalization of capital, disciplines governments and improves governance. We demonstrate that globalization affects governance, by increasing a country's vulnerability to sudden capital flight. This increased threat of capital flight can discipline governments and improve governance and welfare by placing countries in a golden straitjacket. However, globalization may also overdiscipline governments - resulting in a perverse impact on governmental incentives that catalyzes (mis)governance. Accordingly, the paper suggests a novel (and qualified) role for capital controls. Finally, we provide some suggestive evidence consistent with the predictions from our theoretical framework. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper: Monetary Policy and International Finance 3715 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F55 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F36 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | globalization | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | governance | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | capital flight | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | capital controls | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | discipline | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kapitalmarktliberalisierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Globalisierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Good Governance | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Governance-Ansatz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Regierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kapitalflucht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kapitalverkehrspolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Globalization and the (mis)governance of nations | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 685242927 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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