Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55344
Authors: 
Bhattacharya, Sourav
Deb, Joyee
Kundu, Tapas
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3699
Abstract: 
We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate societys resources, and we allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and wage conflict. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting opposition members, but such economic exclusion implies lower per capita shares and higher risk of conflict. In equilibrium, allocations are non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. Moreover, limited commitment with respect to mobility gives rise to inefficient conflict in equilibrium.
Subjects: 
conflict
inter-group mobility
political competition
resource allocation
JEL: 
D72
D74
D78
P48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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