EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55339
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKugler, Tamaren_US
dc.contributor.authorKausel, Edgar E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKocher, Martin G.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-15T17:37:44Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-15T17:37:44Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55339-
dc.description.abstractMany decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. In the present article, we review the literature on decision making made by groups of the past 25 years. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner's dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal-agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that groups behave closer to the game-theoretical assumption of rationality and selfishness than individuals. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Behavioural Economics 3701en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordgroup decision makingen_US
dc.subject.keywordinteractive decision makingen_US
dc.subject.keywordrationalityen_US
dc.subject.keyworddiscontinuity effecten_US
dc.subject.stwGruppenentscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwRationales Verhaltenen_US
dc.titleAre groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groupsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn685229548en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
685229548.pdf162.65 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.