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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) >
Discussion Papers, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, WZB >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55225
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Braun, Sebastian | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dwenger, Nadja | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kübler, Dorothea | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Westkamp, Alexander | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-02-08 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-02-10T14:21:19Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-02-10T14:21:19Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55225 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions, which first allocates seats in the quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance (SDA) algorithm, which simultaneously allocates seats in all quotas. Our main result is that the current procedure, designed to give top-grade students an advantage, actually harms them, as students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for top-grade students and could thus be a valuable tool for redesigning university admissions in Germany. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | WZB Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion papers // Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik: Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten SP II 2012-201 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C78 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C92 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D78 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | I20 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | college admissions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | quotas | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | matching | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Gale-Shapley mechanism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Boston mechanism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Hochschule | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Studienfach | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Angebot | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Quotenregulierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Studierende | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nachfrage | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Matching | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Shapley-Wert | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Deutschland | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 684938618 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:SPII2012201 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB Discussion Papers, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, WZB
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