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dc.contributor.authorBraun, Sebastianen_US
dc.contributor.authorDwenger, Nadjaen_US
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorotheaen_US
dc.contributor.authorWestkamp, Alexanderen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-10T14:21:19Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-10T14:21:19Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55225-
dc.description.abstractQuotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions, which first allocates seats in the quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance (SDA) algorithm, which simultaneously allocates seats in all quotas. Our main result is that the current procedure, designed to give top-grade students an advantage, actually harms them, as students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for top-grade students and could thus be a valuable tool for redesigning university admissions in Germany.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWZB Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion papers // Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik: Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten SP II 2012-201en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelI20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcollege admissionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordquotasen_US
dc.subject.keywordmatchingen_US
dc.subject.keywordGale-Shapley mechanismen_US
dc.subject.keywordBoston mechanismen_US
dc.subject.stwHochschuleen_US
dc.subject.stwStudienfachen_US
dc.subject.stwAngeboten_US
dc.subject.stwQuotenregulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwStudierendeen_US
dc.subject.stwNachfrageen_US
dc.subject.stwMatchingen_US
dc.subject.stwShapley-Werten_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleImplementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn684938618en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:SPII2012201-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB
Discussion Papers, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, WZB

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