Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55208 
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dc.contributor.authorTyson, Christopher J.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-09T14:07:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-09T14:07:42Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55208-
dc.description.abstractWe formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. Our analysis uses a backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the authority to force one of the available alternatives. Iterative dominance then implies that the alternative characterized in this way will be agreed upon at the outset - or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aQueen Mary University of London, Department of Economics |cLondonen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x644en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbackward inductionen
dc.subject.keywordcoalitionen
dc.subject.keywordcoreen
dc.subject.keywordweak dominanceen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen
dc.subject.stwCoreen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn598473564en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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