Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55208
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dc.contributor.authorTyson, Christopher J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-09T14:07:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-09T14:07:42Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55208-
dc.description.abstractWe formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. Our analysis uses a backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the authority to force one of the available alternatives. Iterative dominance then implies that the alternative characterized in this way will be agreed upon at the outset - or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aQueen Mary, Univ. of London, School of Economics and Finance |cLondonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper // School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London |x644en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelC62en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbackward inductionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoalitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoreen_US
dc.subject.keywordweak dominanceen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwCoreen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDominance solvability of dynamic bargaining gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn598473564en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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