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Title:Competition of e-commerce intermediaries PDF Logo
Authors:Matros, Alexander
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Working Paper // School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 675
Abstract:In e-commerce, where information collection is essentially costless and geographic location of traders matters very little, fierce competition between providers of similar services is expected. We consider a model where two e-commerce intermediaries (internet shops) compete for sellers. We show that two non-identical shops may coexist in equilibrium if the population of sellers is sufficiently differentiated in their time preferences. In such an equilibrium less patient sellers choose the more popular (with a higher rate of arrival of new buyers) and more expensive shop, while more patient sellers prefer the less popular and cheaper one.
Subjects:e-commerce
intermediary
competition
listing fee
closing fee
JEL:C73
D43
D82
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London

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