Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55203
Authors: 
Matros, Alexander
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper // School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 675
Abstract: 
In e-commerce, where information collection is essentially costless and geographic location of traders matters very little, fierce competition between providers of similar services is expected. We consider a model where two e-commerce intermediaries (internet shops) compete for sellers. We show that two non-identical shops may coexist in equilibrium if the population of sellers is sufficiently differentiated in their time preferences. In such an equilibrium less patient sellers choose the more popular (with a higher rate of arrival of new buyers) and more expensive shop, while more patient sellers prefer the less popular and cheaper one.
Subjects: 
e-commerce
intermediary
competition
listing fee
closing fee
JEL: 
C73
D43
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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