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dc.contributor.authorHyee, Raphaelaen_US
dc.contributor.authorRobledo, Julio R.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-09T14:06:33Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-09T14:06:33Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55165-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a two period family decision making model in which spouses bargain over their contributions to a family public good and the distribution of private consumption. In contrast to most models in the literature, specialization within the couple emerges endogenously from the production of the public good, and is not caused by exogenous differences between the spouses. Increasing marginal benefits of labour market experience make specialization efficient, even if both spouses have equal market and household productivities on the outset. If spouses are not able to enter into a binding contract governing the distribution of private consumption in the second period, the spouse specialized in market labour cannot commit to compensate the other spouse for foregone investments in earnings power. As a consequence, this spouse may withdraw part of his/her contribution and the provision level of the household good is likely to be inefficiently low.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherQueen Mary, Univ. of London, School of Economics and Finance Londonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper // School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 640en_US
dc.subject.jelD19en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfamily bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordspecializationen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivate provision of public goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten_US
dc.subject.stwHaushaltsproduktionen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwScheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSpecialization in the bargaining familyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn594025265en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London

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