Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55130
Authors: 
Finan, Frederico S.
Schechter, Laura
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5965
Abstract: 
While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.
Subjects: 
vote-buying
reciprocity
redistributive politics
voting
social preferences
JEL: 
H0
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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