EconStor >
Universität Passau >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Passau >
Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55014
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGraf Lambsdorff, Johannen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:43Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55014-
dc.description.abstractThis study embeds transaction cost analysis into a Law and Economics model to produce general recommendations on how to deter bribery. Governments may deter bribery either by high penalties and risks of detection, potentially supported by leniency given to those who report their infraction (deterrence regime). Another local optimum is achieved if the government amplifies the risk of opportunism, aggravating the difficulties of enforcing a bribe transaction. This involves a low probability of detection and allowing offenders to keep their ill-gotten gains. If bribes are paid upfront bribe taking will face only mild punishment (constrained enforcement regime).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. Passau, Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. Passauen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPassauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-60-10en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBriberyen_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordLeniencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordEnforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordDeterrenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordOpportunismen_US
dc.subject.keywordReportingen_US
dc.subject.keywordWhistle-blowingen_US
dc.subject.keywordNullityen_US
dc.titleDeterrence and constrained enforcement: Alternative regimes to deal with briberyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn684338645en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V6010-
Appears in Collections:Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
684338645.pdf543.45 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.