|
EconStor >
Universität Passau >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Passau >
Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55014
|
| | |
| Title: | | Deterrence and constrained enforcement: Alternative regimes to deal with bribery  |
| Authors: | | Graf Lambsdorff, Johann |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-60-10 |
| Abstract: | | This study embeds transaction cost analysis into a Law and Economics model to produce general recommendations on how to deter bribery. Governments may deter bribery either by high penalties and risks of detection, potentially supported by leniency given to those who report their infraction (deterrence regime). Another local optimum is achieved if the government amplifies the risk of opportunism, aggravating the difficulties of enforcing a bribe transaction. This involves a low probability of detection and allowing offenders to keep their ill-gotten gains. If bribes are paid upfront bribe taking will face only mild punishment (constrained enforcement regime). |
| Subjects: | | Bribery Corruption Leniency Enforcement Deterrence Opportunism Reporting Whistle-blowing Nullity |
| JEL: | | K42 D73 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55014
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|