EconStor >
Universität Passau >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Passau >
Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNell, Mathiasen_US
dc.description.abstractEven though high penalties for corruption offences have a deterrent and preventive effect, they also entrap bribe-takers and bribe-givers in their corrupt relationship. Moreover, pending penalties can be misused to make threats against opportunistic behavior and can thus stabilize risky bribe agreements. This paper shows how voluntary disclosure programs can be strategically applied to break the pact of silence and to promote opportunism in a targeted way. Against this background the paper studies the leniency provisions in the penal codes of 56 countries. The analysis reveals deficiencies in the utilization and in the design of voluntary disclosure programs for corruption offences.en_US
dc.publisherUniv. Passau, Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. Passauen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPassauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-52-07en_US
dc.subject.keywordCriminal Lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary Disclosure Programen_US
dc.titleStrategic aspects of voluntary disclosure programs for corruption offences: Towards a design of good practiceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
68432976X.pdf259.89 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.