Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55013
Authors: 
Nell, Mathias
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-52-07
Abstract: 
Even though high penalties for corruption offences have a deterrent and preventive effect, they also entrap bribe-takers and bribe-givers in their corrupt relationship. Moreover, pending penalties can be misused to make threats against opportunistic behavior and can thus stabilize risky bribe agreements. This paper shows how voluntary disclosure programs can be strategically applied to break the pact of silence and to promote opportunism in a targeted way. Against this background the paper studies the leniency provisions in the penal codes of 56 countries. The analysis reveals deficiencies in the utilization and in the design of voluntary disclosure programs for corruption offences.
Subjects: 
Corruption
Criminal Law
Leniency
Self-Reporting
Voluntary Disclosure Program
JEL: 
K14
L14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
259.89 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.