EconStor >
Universität Passau >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Passau >
Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55010
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNell, Mathiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:37Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55010-
dc.description.abstractThis paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It is argued that other instruments are more suitable for preventing corruption.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. Passau, Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. Passauen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPassauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-53-07en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.jelG38en_US
dc.subject.jelK12en_US
dc.subject.jelK14en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBriberyen_US
dc.subject.keywordContractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordDue Diligenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordEnforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordImpugnmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordLiabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordLeniencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordNullityen_US
dc.subject.keywordPrivate Law Validityen_US
dc.subject.keywordVoidabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary Disclosure (Program)en_US
dc.titleContracts induced by means of bribery: Should they be void or valid?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn684331985en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V5307-
Appears in Collections:Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
684331985.pdf174.94 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.