Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55010
Authors: 
Nell, Mathias
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-53-07
Abstract: 
This paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It is argued that other instruments are more suitable for preventing corruption.
Subjects: 
Bribery
Contracts
Corruption
Due Diligence
Enforcement
Impugnment
Liability
Leniency
Nullity
Private Law Validity
Voidability
Voluntary Disclosure (Program)
JEL: 
G34
G38
K12
K14
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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