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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Graf Lambsdorff, Johann | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-01-27 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-03T15:36:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-02-03T15:36:31Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Governments and private firms try to contain corruption among their staff mostly in a top-down, rules-based approach. They limit discretion, increase monitoring or impose harsher penalties. Principles-based, bottom-up approaches to anticorruption, instead, emphasize the importance of value systems and employee's intrinsic motivation. This embraces the invigorating of social control systems, encouraging whistle-blowing, coding of good practice and alerting to red flags. This paper investigates how some top-down measures run counter to bottom-up contributions. Examples range from penalties imposed with zero-tolerance, debarment or the nullity of contracts. While top-down elements are indispensable for containing corruption they must be designed well in order to avoid discouraging the bottom-up endeavors. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cPassau | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aPassauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |xV-57-08 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K42 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Corruption | en |
dc.subject.keyword | whistle-blowing | en |
dc.subject.keyword | contract penalties | en |
dc.subject.keyword | debarment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | nullity | en |
dc.title | The organization of anticorruption: Getting incentives right! | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 684336847 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:upadvr:V5708 | en |
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