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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006
  

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dc.contributor.authorGraf Lambsdorff, Johannen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:31Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:31Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006-
dc.description.abstractGovernments and private firms try to contain corruption among their staff mostly in a top-down, rules-based approach. They limit discretion, increase monitoring or impose harsher penalties. Principles-based, bottom-up approaches to anticorruption, instead, emphasize the importance of value systems and employee's intrinsic motivation. This embraces the invigorating of social control systems, encouraging whistle-blowing, coding of good practice and alerting to red flags. This paper investigates how some top-down measures run counter to bottom-up contributions. Examples range from penalties imposed with zero-tolerance, debarment or the nullity of contracts. While top-down elements are indispensable for containing corruption they must be designed well in order to avoid discouraging the bottom-up endeavors.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. Passau, Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. Passauen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPassauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-57-08en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordwhistle-blowingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontract penaltiesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddebarmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordnullityen_US
dc.titleThe organization of anticorruption: Getting incentives right!en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn684336847en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V5708-
Appears in Collections:Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau

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