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Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Passau >
Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Graf Lambsdorff, Johann | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-01-27 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-02-03T15:36:31Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-02-03T15:36:31Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Governments and private firms try to contain corruption among their staff mostly in a top-down, rules-based approach. They limit discretion, increase monitoring or impose harsher penalties. Principles-based, bottom-up approaches to anticorruption, instead, emphasize the importance of value systems and employee's intrinsic motivation. This embraces the invigorating of social control systems, encouraging whistle-blowing, coding of good practice and alerting to red flags. This paper investigates how some top-down measures run counter to bottom-up contributions. Examples range from penalties imposed with zero-tolerance, debarment or the nullity of contracts. While top-down elements are indispensable for containing corruption they must be designed well in order to avoid discouraging the bottom-up endeavors. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Univ. Passau, Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. Passau | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-57-08 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K42 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Corruption | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | whistle-blowing | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | contract penalties | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | debarment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | nullity | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The organization of anticorruption: Getting incentives right! | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 684336847 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:upadvr:V5708 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau
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